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NO MORE LITIGATION GAMBLES: TOWARD A
NEW SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The United States Supreme Court in the 1986 cases of Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 2 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett3
enunciated standards for granting summary judgment that signal a change in traditional
summary judgment doctrine.' By removing doctrinal barriers of its own creation,° the
Court approved a more liberal rule effectively challenging that party with the burden
of proof at trial. 6 The standards announced in Matsushita and Anderson affect the burden
of proof on the party opposing a summary judgment motion. The standard announced
in Celotex affects the burden of production on the party bringing the motion, and the
subsequent burden of production and proof on the party opposing the motion. The
new standards will have their greatest impact on complex cases involving state of mind,
motive, and intent, but their overall effect is to create a more favorable climate for
granting summary judgment in all types of cases.'
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgrnent. 8 Rule
56(c) provides that summary judgment should be entered when "pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The Rule is designed to eliminate trial where
no genuine factual issues exist.'" Although it is a means of effecting judicial efficiency
1 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
2
 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
3 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
Matsushita has been called a "judicial bombshell." Stoll and Goldfein, Economic Sense in the
Supreme Court, 195 N.Y.L.J., Apr. 15, 1986, at I, col. I, and a case which "appeal-NJ to signal a new
day." Laufer, New Standards For Summary Judgment in Federal Courts, 115 N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1986, at
I, col. 1, at 3, col. 2.
See infra notes 42-64 and 120-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of Potter v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464 (1962), and Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 1 ll (1979).
6 Commentators have noted that traditional summary judgment doctrine unnecessarily impedes
the motion's single most important use: to challenge the party with the burden of proof. Louis,
Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L.
RF.v, 707, 722 (1984) thereinafter The Actual Malice Controversy]. See also Louis, Federal Summary
Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 769 (1974) [hereinafter A Critical Analysis)
(summary judgment employed to identify factually deficient claims).
One commentator has asserted that through mistaken analysis various opinions of the United
States Supreme Court created a climate singling out cases involving state of mind, motive, or intent
as incapable of or inappropriate for summary judgment. Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility
in the Summary Judgment Context: A setter Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev. 774, 786 (1983) [hereinafter
Sonenshein).
8 FED. R. Cry. P. 56.
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
10 "The very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to
assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Advisory Committee's Note,
Report of Proposed Amendments To Certain Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts.
Submitted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, September, 1962, 31 F.R.D. 621, 648 (1962)
[hereinafter Advisory Committee's Note].
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by eliminating unnecessary litigation," the immediate effect of Rule 56 is felt by the
litigants. Where the defendant is the moving party, the grant of a summary judgment
motion relieves the defendant from the burden of a trial. The plaintiff, in turn, is
foreclosed from presenting his or her case to a jury, because the judgment is that no
genuine issues exist for a jury to try. 12 Although Rule 56(c) provides that either party to
a civil suit may move for summary judgment," this note will focus on those cases where
the defendant is the moving party.
Although Rule 56 deliberately does not exclude particular kinds of issues from the
operation of summary judgment procedures, 14 courts have hesitated to apply the Rule
in cases involving state of mind, motive, and intent." Issues of intent are a common
element in these types of cases, and their resolution depends on the observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, who are subject to direct and cross-examina-
tion." Therefore, such cases generally were considered inappropriate for summary
disposition," and particularly appropriate for jury resolution." In sum, the courts did
not want to replace trial by jury with "trial by affidavit.'"
Responding to such concerns, the Supreme Court raised doctrinal barriers against
the use of summary judgment in the context of antitrust 20 and libel?' areas which are
in effect paradigms of the state of mind case. Commentators 22 and judges," however,
criticized this categorical exclusion of certain kinds of cases from the operation of Rule
56. Critics of the barriers imposed by the Supreme Court argued that these barriers
hindered the Rule's purpose of eliminating needless trials. 24
The Supreme Court implicitly overturned these barriers against the use of summary
judgment in cases involving the defendant's state of mind in its 1986 term in Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,25 a libel case, and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
" Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 774.
12 See 6 J. MooRE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1[56.06[2] (2d ed.
1986) (if the only question involved in the litigation is one of law and there is no dispute as to
material issues of fact, losing party may not contend that it has been deprived of right to jury trial).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (b).
14 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 479 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting); Sonenshein, supra
note 7, at n.49.
15 Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 780.
18 Morrison v. Nissan Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979). See also Advisory Committee's Note,
supra note 10, at 648 (where an issue as to a material fact cannot be resolved without observation
of the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility, summary judgment is not
appropriate).
17 The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note 6, at 709.
Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 780.
" Id. at 779. See also Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues
of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 467 (judicial reservations about summary judgment in part have
their origins in judges' profound attachment to the jury system).
" See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (summary judgment to
be used sparingly in complex antitrust actions where proof consists of motive and intent).
21 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (dictum) (actual malice involves
proof of state of mind and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition).
22 Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 809. See also The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note 6, at 716,
720-21.
25 See The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note 6, at 709 & n.20.
Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 810.
25 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
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Corp.,26 an antitrust case. In Anderson, the Supreme Court held that the "clear and
convincing" evidence requirement must be considered by a court ruling on a motion for
summary judgment in a case where the actual malice' standard — which involves a state
of mind determination — applies." More broadly, the Court held that the inquiry is
whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury,
or whether it is so "one-sided" that one party must prevail as a matter of law. 26
In the context of a complex conspiracy case, the Supreme Court in Matsushita held
that to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff' seeking damages fOr violation
of 1 of the Sherman Act, which proscribes "fe]very contract, combination ... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade ... ," 3" must present evidence that tends to exclude the
possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently. 3 ' Proof of conspiracy nec-
essarily requires an inquiry into motive and intent," and if the factual context renders
plaintiff's claim of motive implausible, then the plaintiff must present more persuasive
evidence to support his or her claim than otherwise would be required."
The Anderson and Matsushita decisions are important because they have introduced
a heightened standard of judicial inquiry at the summary judgment stage. Courts faced
with a motion for summary judgment in a state of mind case no longer can deny
categorically the motion and defer consideration of the state of mind issue to a jury
determination. Instead, after Matsushita, courts must subject the litigants' evidence of
conspiracy to searching inquiry at the summary judgment stage. Where a heightened
burden of proof applies, as in cases alleging actual malice defamation, Anderson requires
that a plaintiff meet that heightened standard before being entitled to a jury trial. in
practical terms, where a defendant in a case involving state of mind moves for summary
judgment, a plaintiff no longer can expect a court simply to deny the motion because
the case involves a determination of the defendant's state of mind. Overcoming a motion
for summary, judgment is now a higher hurdle for plaintiffs.
In Anderson and Matsushita the Court Focused on the plaintiff's burden of proof in
demonstrating that there is a genuine factual issue for trial. In a third case, Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett," the Court widened its focus to include the defendant's burden of production
in supporting its motion for summary judgment. In Celotex, a products liability case
26 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
23 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court held that, in a
libel suit brought by a public official, the first amendment requires the plaintiff to show that in
publishing the defamatory statement the defendant acted with "actual malice," defined as "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279—
80. The Court further held that such actual malice must be shown with "convincing clarity," Id, at
285-86.
28 Anderson, loll S. Ct. at 2513.
28 Id. at 2512. Under the Supreme Court's holding, the inquiry is not whether there are a
minimum of facts supporting the plaintiff's case but whether a jiffy reasonably could find either
that the plaintiff proved its case by the quality and quantity of' evidence required by the governing
law or that it did not. Id. at 2513.
3° 15 U.S.C.	 1 (1982).
'I Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1357.
32 See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of proof of intent in antitrust
cases.
" Matsushita. 106 S. Ct. at 1356. The Court held that the plaintiff 'must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id.
34 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
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which did not involve state of mind issues, the Court held that Rule 56 neither expressly
nor impliedly requires a defendant moving for summary judgment to support his or
her motion with affidavits or similar materials which negate the plaintiff's claim. 35 The
Court — emphasizing that summary judgment is a tool designed to isolate factually
unsupported claims and to prevent them from going to tria1 35 — clearly stated that courts
should give due regard not only to the rights of plaintiffs who have an adequate basis
for bringing their claims to a jury, but also to defendants opposing claims that have no
factual basis. 37
 Thus, while Anderson and Matsushita place a heavy burden of proof on a
plaintiff to support its claim in order to survive summary judgment attack, Celotex eases
the burden of production on a defendant launching that attack. It is thus easier for
defendants to bring a motion for summary judgment, and more difficult for plaintiffs
to resist.
Taken together, this trilogy of cases redefines Rule 56 and gives it greater potential
to eliminate trial, even in cases once considered inappropriate for summary disposition:
those involving state of mind, motive, or intent. The trial courts are now required to
give searching inquiry to the plaintiff's evidence in order to determine if there is a
genuine issue for trial. A categorical assessment that a case involves issues of state of
mind, motive, or intent will no longer, standing alone, bar entry of summary judgment.
This note analyzes the development of the Supreme Court's new summary judgment
doctrine. Section I will examine the evolution of the Court's caution against the use of
summary judgment in cases involving state of mind, motive, or intent. The section will
focus on summary judgment doctrine in the areas of antitrust and "actual malice"
defamation, as examples of state of mind cases in which the Supreme Court directly
cautioned against the use of summary judgment. Section I I will examine how Anderson
and Matsushita implicitly removed those cautionary barriers. Additionally, Section II will
examine the articulation in Celotex of a doctrine that requires that courts, when ruling
on motions for summary judgment, must respect not only a plaintiff's right to trial, but
also a defendant's right to summary judgment where the plaintiff has not met the burden
of proof required to demonstrate a need for trial. Section III will examine how the
purpose of Rule 56 is better served by the removal of these doctrinal cautions and by
the formulation of a more liberal standard. This last section will address the application
of the new standards. The note will conclude that the Supreme Court has signalled a
new regard for the use of summary judgment that makes the procedure both workable
and desirable.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COURT'S CAUTION AGAINST THE USE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN CASES INVOLVING STATE OF MIND, MOTIVE, OR INTENT
Cases involving state of mind, motive or intent have posed particular problems in
the application of the summary judgment procedure.38 Courts reasoned that observing
the demeanor of the testifying defendants during direct and cross-examination was
critical to the resolution of the issue of intent, and therefore, more properly within the
province of the jury." Courts, erring on the side of safety, thus were reluctant to grant
3s
	 at 2553.
36 Id, at 2555.
37 Id .
" Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 786.
39 Morrison v. Nissan Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979).
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summary judgmeni where the defendant's state of mind was at issue. 4° Consequently,
caution was the watchword for judges at the summary judgment stage.'"
A. The Supreme Court Caution Against the Use of Summary Judgment in Antitrust Cases
In 1964, the Court in Puller v. Columbia Broadcasting System articulated its clearest
expression of the caution against the use of summary judgment in state of' mind cases
within the context of an antitrust conspiracy case. 42 In the antitrust context, state of
mind issues may include a party's improper motive to monopolize or an illicit intent to
. conspire to monopolize. 45 Some element of deliberateness must be shown." The offense
of conspiracy to monopolize under Section 2 includes such elements as proof of a
concerted action deliberately entered into with the specific intent to achieve monopoly
power.45 A specific intent to create a monopoly need not be shown by direct evidence of
subjective state of mind, but can be inferred from conduct. 46
Poller was a private antitrust action brought against the Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS) alleging conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade in violation of Sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 47 The plaintiff in Poller claimed that CBS cancelled its
affiliation with his ultra high frequency (UHF) station pursuant to a conspiracy between
CBS and third parties to drive the plaintiff' out of business. The plaintiff' alleged that
the purpose of the conspiracy was to give CBS a short-term monopoly of the UHF
market in the Milwaukee area and eventually to eliminate UHF competition in Milwaukee
entirely:ffi The District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment,49 based on four affidavits which alleged the lack of an illicit
motive required to prove a violation of the Sherman Act." The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia affirmed. 5 '
" Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 787. Sonenshein traces this view to Scmnentheil v. Christian
Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401 (1899), a case involving a directed verdict, where the Court
held that while a jury has no right to disregard arbitrarily defendant's uncontradicied and unim-
peached evidence on the issue of lack of fraudulent intent, the evidence must nonetheless be
submitted to a jury to determine the credibility of defendant's witnesses. Id. at 408. Therefore, the
directed verdict was made in error. Id. Cases involving the existence of fraud were said to be
peculiarly within the province of the jury, from which it was rarely safe to withdraw them. Id. at
410.
See Morrison, 601 F.2d at 141,
42 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
4S For instance, a firm may obtain monopoly power and violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act
by "deliberately pursuing a course of conduct which hats] the effect of expanding or maintaining
power, or [by forming] a specific intent to maintain its power by such conduct." L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 30 (1977).
44 Id.
" Id. at 132.
4"Id. at 133.
47 Puller, 368 U.S. at 465. The plaintiff sued under Section 4 or the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15, which provides that "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws is given a private right of action." Potter, 368 U.S. at
475 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 466.
40 Killer v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 179 F. Supp. 802, 805 (D.D.C. 1959).
5"Potter, 368 U.S. at 468.
5L Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 284 F.2d 599, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
752	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 28:747
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the evidence may not have been
sufficient to warrant the finding that CBS acted with improper motive, the truth was not
evident from the record and summary judgment should, therefore, have been denied. 52
In dictum, the Court expressed a restrictive view of the use of summary judgment in
antitrust cases where state of mind is a critical issue:
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex
antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is
largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken
the plot. It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-
examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony
can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so
long has been the hallmark of "even handed justice.""
In Poller, the Court thus provided a simple, categorical standard for evaluating a sum-
mary judgment motion in an antitrust case.51 Where issues of intent are involved, the
Poller Court suggests that trial is preferred to summary disposition." This approach is
appropriate even where the evidence does not support the claim and the plaintiff is
unlikely to succeed at trial."
Not all of the justices in Poller agreed that a restrictive use of summary procedures
was required in antitrust cases.57 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan noted that the
language of Rule 56 does not indicate that it should be used any more "sparingly" in
antitrust litigation — or that its use in antitrust cases is subject to more stringent criteria
— than in any other type of case." Noting that the private antitrust remedy tempts
vexatious litigation and requires an inordinate amount of time from the trial courts,
Justice Harlan found "good reason for giving the summary judgment role its full legit-
imate sweep in this field.""
Justice Harlan found it important that the plaintiff in Poller had complete access to
all potential witnesses by means of pretrial discovery, yet failed to produce any evidence
that would support his claim of improper motive. 6° In Justice Harlan's opinion, if the
case had proceeded to trial on such evidence, it could not have been permitted to go to
the jury.6 ' Justice Harlan noted that because the plaintiff presented no extrinsic evidence
of an unlawful purpose, and CBS had denied any unlawful motive to eliminate plaintiff
as a competitor, the jury was left with no affirmative evidence of any intent to restrain
trade." According to Justice Harlan, the possibility that the jury might disbelieve CBS's
assertions of no unlawful motive was not enough to take the case to trial.° A trial should
52 Poller, 368 U.S. at 472-73.
55 Id. at 473.
54 Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 790.
55 Poller, 368 U.S. at 473.
See id. at 472-73.
" Justices Frankfurter, Whittaker, and Stewart joined Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion. Id.
at 474.
5"
	 at 478 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6° Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" I Id. at 479-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"2 Id, at 480 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"5 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
July 1987)	 SUMMARY JUDGMENT	 753
not proceed, said Justice Harlan, on the mere hope that witnesses will revise their
testimony upon the stand: "Courts do not exist to afford opportunities for such litigation
gambles,""
Whereas justice Harlan rejected the majority's reasoning as being antithetical to the
proper application of Rule 56, the lower courts enthusiastically embraced the Puller
reasoning,65 and invoked it as a "talismanic statement" that, in antitrust cases, summary
judgment was inappropriate." Faller thus became a kind of "magic wand waved indis-
criminately by those opposing summary judgment motions in antitrust actions." 67
Despite the Court's language in Puller disfavoring the summary disposition of anti-
trust cases and the strong response of the lower courts heeding that language, summary
judgment was still available to defendants. Several years after Pollen, the Supreme Court
in First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co. affirmed a grant of summary judgment
to a Sherman Act defendant." The majority opinion attempted to distinguish Paler on
its facts, and thus limit the broad sweep of its near prohibition of summary judgment
in complex antitrust cases, yet the dissent argued that the majority opinion could not
possibly be reconciled with the Poller dictum warning against summary judgment in such
cases. 69
The majority of the Court in Cities Service recognized substantial similarities between
the case at bar and Puller, in that both cases involved the motive underlying a failure to
deal with a competitor." The majority, however, noted that there were "crucial differ-
ences" between the two cases and in the plausibility of each plaintiff's allegations.''
Specifically, the Court stated that in Puller, the competitive relationship was such that it
was plausible for the plaintiff to argue that CBS had conspiratorial motives. In Cities
Service, in contrast, it was much more plausible that the defendant's motives were non-
conspiratorial. 72
The majority opinion in Cities Service reflected Justice Harlan's concerns in his dissent
in Pollen" The Court noted in Cities Service that the mere hope of developing supporting
evidence at trial was not enough to entitle any antitrust plaintiff who files a complaint
to proceed to trial in the absence of any signifiCant probative evidence tending to support
the complaint. 74 While an issue of fact would not have to be resolved conclusively in
54 Id. (I-tartan, J., dissenting).
6' The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note 6, at 713-14.
" Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 787.
67 Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1977).
6" 391 U.S. 253, 299 (1968).
69 Id. at 303 (Black, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 285.
71 Id.
72 Id. The dissent stated that where there are possible illegitimate motives, it could never accept
as the appropriate standard under Potter whether other motives were more probable. Id. at 305
(Black, J., dissenting). More broadly, the dissent stated that "this case illustrates that the summary
judgment technique tempts judges to take over the jury trial of cases, thus depriving parties of
their constitutional right to trial by jury." Id, at 304 (Black, J., dissenting).
" Sec supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Harlan's concerns
about the Court's restrictive view of summary judgment procedure as enunciated in Pollen
74 Cities Service, 391 U.S. at '289-90. See also Morrison v. Nissan Co., 601 F.2d, 139, 141-42 (4th
Cir. 1979) (although motive and intent play leading roles in antitrust cases, Rule 56 is not to be
read out of antitrust cases).
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favor of the plaintiff, the right to trial on antitrust claims would be recognized only
where there was sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require
the factfinder's resolution of the differing versions of the truth at trial."
While the Court in Cities Service nominally stood by Poller by confining the holding
to its facts," other courts more explicitly criticized the Poller opinion. In the 1981 case
of Weit v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals said that no greater caution or concern was required for antitrust litigant
rights than for litigant rights in other substantive areas of litigation." The Weit court
refused to ignore the practical realities of complex antitrust litigation and held that
judicial economy mandates the entry of summary judgment when, after extensive dis-
covery, the court concludes that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
plaintiffs." A trial on such unsupported claims, said the court, serves "only as a forum
for impeachment and argument by counsel."" The Weit court distinguished Poller from
the case at bar, noting that in Poller, the permissible inferences from the evidence favored
the plaintiff." In Welt, however, the court stated that the circumstantial evidence sup-
porting the complaint, when measured against the evidence supporting the defendant's
denials, was so insubstantial that it precluded a verdict for the plaintiffs." Thus, the Wen
court read Rule 56 as a neutral device for eliminating needless trials, affording no
greater deference to antitrust plaintiffs.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1979 case of Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., was more explicit in its disregard of the Poller caution." Specifically, the Aladdin Oil
court stated that the "facile notion pressed upon us that antitrust cases are typically
unsuited for summary procedures can be traced to obiter dictum in Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc." 83 In accord with the Poller dissent, the Aladdin Oil court noted
that Rule 56 should apply equally to all actions." The court stated that antitrust cases
are not necessarily ill-suited for summary judgment but that any cases which raise
genuine issues of motive, intent, and credibility are more appropriately suited for trial."
The court concluded that the best procedure in deciding a motion for summary judg-
ment was not to rely on °biter dictum or quotable statements, but on the text of the Rule
itself, which states that summary judgment is appropriate in any case in which there is
not a genuine issue of material fact. 86
75
 Cities Service, 391 U.S. at 289.
7" See id. at 284-86. See also Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 790-91.
" 641 F.2d 457, 464 (7th Cir. 1981).
78 Id.
7° Id.
8° Id. at 466.
8 ' Id.
82 See 603 F.2d 1107, 1110-12 (5th Cir. 1979).
" /d. at 1110.
" /d. at 1111.
85 Id.
8° Id. at 1112. Other courts have also cleared the Poller hurdle and granted summary judgment
where state of mind and issues of intent are present. One commentator points out that where there
was no probative evidence on the state of mind issue, these courts have granted summary judgment
as they would in a case not involving state of mind where there was no genuine factual dispute.
Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 794. See e.g., Products Liability Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins.,
682 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant is entitled to have complaint dismissed on summary
judgment, if, after discovery, it is clear that plaintiff will not be able to establish an essential element
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The Poller dictum was a statement of the traditional doctrine that summary judgment
is inappropriate in cases involving state of mind. The Poller standard prefers trial, even
where sufficient evidence to support the claim is lacking and the plaintiff is unlikely to
succeed at tria1. 87 While many courts read Poller as a kind of prohibition against the use
of summary judgment in antitrust cases," other courts — most notably the Supreme
Court in Cities Service — confined Puller to its facts,89 These courts recognized that no
plaintiff, even an antitrust plaintiff, was entitled to a trial where there was no significant
probative evidence tending to support the complaint. 90 The Poller standard for appli-
cation of Rule 56 nevertheless remained the traditional doctrine. Although easy to apply
because a motion for summary judgment could be denied simply by identifying the case
as one involving complex issues of state of mind, the Poller standard violated the Rule's
purpose of eliminating needless trials. 9 i
B. Confiding Concerns in Actual Malice Defamation Cases
The law of libel presented a curious situation for judges deciding summary judgment
motions, where proof of actual malice, a state of mind issue, was an element of the
plaintiff's case. The presence of a state of mind issue, usually a signal to the courts to
protect the plaintiff's right to trial, also signalled the courts to protect the defendant's
first amendment rights to free speech, where the state of mind issue was the presence
or absence of actual malice. A judge hearing a motion for summary judgment in an
actual malice libel case thus faced conflicting concerns in deciding whether the case
should go to trial.
These conflicting concerns presented, on the one hand, the general judicial reluct-
ance to grant summary judgment in state of mind cases where observation of' the
demeanor of the witness was deemed critical to the determination of credibility, 92 thus
suggesting that plaintiffs should proceed to trial. On the other hand, the developments
in the substantive law of libel — which increased the plaintiff's burden of proof — made
the plaintiff's case more difficult to prove and thus more susceptible to a grant of
summary judgment for the defendant. The major development in the substantive law
of libel was the 1964 Supreme Court decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, which required
proof of actual malice before a state court could award damages for libel actions brought
by public officials against critics of their official conduct. 93
To prevail in such a case, a plaintiff had to demonstrate that the defendant acted
with actual malice, defined as "with knowledge that it [the allegedly defamatory state-
of claim at trial: "a trial would be a waste of time. This is as true in an antitrust case as in any other
type of case."); Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336,338 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1090 (1982) (summary procedures are appropriate to avoid needless trials and unnecessary expense,
where "the record lin an antitrust case] clearly indicates that there are no circumstances under
which plaintiff can prevail").
87 See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Poller.
"8 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of lower courts' reaction to
Pollen
89 See supra notes 68
-
86 and accompanying text for a discussion of' cases limiting the scope of
Pollen
9° Id,
91 Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 790.
" See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of summary
judgment in state of mind cases.
93 376 U.S. 254,283 (1964).
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merit] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," 91 with "con-
vincing clarity,"" or by "clear and convincing proof." 9° First amendment concerns thus
required the plaintiff to bear a heavier burden of proof — clear and convincing proof
— than that required of most other civil plaintiff's, merely preponderance of the evi-
dence.97
 This heightened and constitutionally required evidentiary standard," therefore,
imposed a heavy burden of proof on plaintiffs and made it more difficult to reach and
persuade a jury. 99
 The Court in New York Times held, however, that a lower burden of
proof would lead to self-censorship,' 90 and would not allow the first amendment guar-
antee of freedom of expression the "breathing space" it needed to survive."
As a result of the Court's decision in New York Times, lower courts hearing actual
malice defamation cases tended to grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment
in spite of the state of mind issues.'" 2 The courts' receptiveness to defendants' motion
for summary judgment was based in part on the belief that self-censorship could result
not only from the defendants' fear of an adverse verdict after a full trial, but also from
defendants' fear of a lengthy trial, even where the defendant would likely prevail at
trial." Thus, by granting summary judgment to defendants in actual malice cases, the
courts responded to both the plaintiff's difficulty in meeting the heightened evidentiary
standard, and to the fear of self-censorship underlying that standard.
The pull of constitutional concerns for freedom of expression proved to be greater
than the resistance of courts to granting summary judgment in state of mind cases.
Thus, despite the general reluctance to grant summary judgment in cases involving state
of mind, a line of cases" developed in which courts, out of first amendment concerns
of self-censorship, consistently granted summary judgment in favor of defamation de-
fendants.'" The practice became so widespread that one court described the grant of
summary judgment in actual malice cases as the rule rather than the exception. 10"
Another court described the grant in favor of defamation defendants to be "rooted as
94 Id, at 280.
"5 Id. at 285-86.
96 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971).
97 Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 49 (D.C. App. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
" Note, Public Figure Defamation: Preserving Summary Judgment To Protect Free Expression, 49
Fonntimit L. REV. 112, 116 (1980) [hereinafter Note].
99 The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note 6, at 707.
1 "0 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
1 ' 11 Id. at 271-72.
112 The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note 6, at 709-11. Louis noted that "[a] survey of the
results of summary judgment motions made by defendants on the issue of actual malice between
1976 and [19]80 shows that over 75% were granted." Id. at 710 n.23.
1 " Comment, The Propriety of Granting Summary Judgment for Defendants in Defamation Suits
Involving Actual Malice, 26 VILL. L. REv. 470, 471-72 (1980-81) [hereinafter Comment].
104 See Comment, supra note 103, at 482 n.86. The author collects an extensive list of cases in
which summary judgment was granted to defamation defendants. See also The Actual Malice Contro-
versy supra, note 6, at 710 n.23, for statistics on the grant of summary judgment to defamation
defendants.
1 " See, e.g., Washington Post v. Keogh. 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1011 (1967) ("In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are even more essential.... The
threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit brought by a popular public official may be as chilling
to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself. ... ").
1 " Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1330 (W.D. Wis. 1977), aff 'rt. 579 F.2d 1027




deeply as judicial precedents can reach." 107 While the trend was clearly in favor of
defamation defendants at the summary judgment stage, differing views developed as to
the exact basis for the ready grant of summary judgment to defendants. 1011 The liberal
grant of summary judgment could be based on either special procedural protection for
defamation defendants, or on the recognition that the substantive law of libel protected
defamation defendants by requiring plaintiffs to meet a more difficult burden of proof
than is generally required in civil cases.
One view, enunciated in 197{) by Judge Skelly Wright in Wasserman v. Time, Inc.,
was that first amendment considerations necessitated a departure from normal summary
judgment procedures in two ways." First, the trial judge would evaluate all the evidence
in its most reasonable light rather than in the light most favorable lo the plaintiff."°
Second, rather than determine whether a reasonable jury could find actual malice with
convincing clarity, the trial judge personally would be required to find actual malice with
convincing clarity if the plaintiff is to survive summary judgment attack and proceed to
trial."' According to Wasserman, first amendment concerns require special judicial in-
volvement at the summary judgment stage and allow the judge to draw reasonable
inferences and weigh credibility in determining whether actual malice has been shown
with "convincing clarity." 2 The Wasserman view thus made the defendant's motion for
summary judgment more likely to succeed.
Another view expressly rejected the suggestion in Wasserman that the trial court
itself should judge the credibility of witnesses and draw its own inferences from the
evidence. Like the Wasserman court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1974 case
of Guam Federation of Teachers, Local 1581 v. Ysrael recognized that special scrutiny of the
evidence is necessary to provide a buffer against interference with first amendment
rights.' The Guam court held, however, that in spite of the special standard, the courts
should examine the evidence in the same manner as in all other cases involving a motion
for summary judgment)" Under Guam, the trial court deciding a summary judgment
motion is not to weigh the proof and make independent findings. Rather, the trial court's
function is to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine issue of
material fact from which a jury, using the appropriate "clear and convincing" standard
of proof, could find actual malice. 15 Thus, whereas the Wasserman view necessitated a
departure from normal summary judgment procedures, the Guam view was that the
usual procedural rules should govern summary judgment and the libel plaintiff was not
IQ7 National Nutritional Foods Ass'n. v. Whelan, 492 F. Stipp. 374, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
" I8 See Nader v. de "roledano, 408 A.2d 31, 45-48 (D.C. App. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078
(1980), for a discussion or the conflicting views as to the proper judicial procedure for reviewing
motions for summary judgment in actual malice cases.
"" 424 F.2d 920, 922-23 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
940 (1970). See also Nader, 408 A.2d at 46.
Wasserman, 424 F.2d at 922 (Wright, J., concurring). See also Nader, 408 A.2d at 46.
I" Wasserman, 424 F.2d at 922 (Wright, J., concurring). See also Nader, 408 A.2d at 46.
1 " Wasserman, 424 F.2d at 922. See also Nader, 408 A.2d at 45-46. While it has been questioned
whether Wright calls for special judicial involvement at the summary judgment stage, or only at
the directed verdict stage, see Comment, supra note 103, at 484 n.91, courts following Wasserman
have applied the convincing clarity standard to the evidence at the summary judgnient level. Id. at
n.92.
HI' 492 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
Id.
"0 Id. at 442; Nader, 408 A.2d at 47.
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required to prove actual malice twice: once to the judge at the summary judgment stage,
and if convinced, then to the jury at trial." The Guam view of the basis for granting
summary judgment for defamation defendants was not as liberal as the Wasserman view,
but like the Wasserman view, it required convincingly clear evidence of actual malice at
the summary judgment stage.
New York Times and its progeny created a judicial sensitivity to first amendment
considerations in actual malice defamation cases, a sensitivity which lead to the ready
granting of summary judgment for defamation defendants."' Some courts, like that in
Wasserman, showed sensitivity to the importance of free speech by departing from normal
summary judgment procedures to formulate a summary judgment procedure directly
favoring defamation defendants. Other courts, like that in Guam, showed judicial sen-
sitivity to the importance of free speech, but did so by formulating a summary judgment
procedure that incorporated the difficult evidentiary burden, required under New York
Times to protect free speech, into normal summary judgment procedures." 3 Thus, the
widespread grant of summary judgment to defamation defendants could be attributed
either to a special procedural protection for such defendants, or to the fact that the
substantive law of libel itself made it difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate the requisite
clear and convincing evidence. 19
As the Supreme Court in Moller had cautioned against the use of summary judgment
in antitrust cases because of state of mind issues, almost twenty years later the Court
expressed a similar caution against the use of summary judgment in actual malice
defamation cases because of the presence of state of mind issues. In the 1979 case of
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, the Supreme Court cast doubt on the ready availability of sum-
mary judgment in actual malice defamation cases as it voiced its disapproval of the
widespread grant of summary judgment in such cases. 120 In what is commonly referred
to as footnote nine, the Court, responding to lower court assertions that summary
judgment was the rule rather than the exception in actual malice defamation cases,' 2 '
expressed doubt about the so-called "rule" and reiterated the familiar doctrine that
because proof of "actual malice" calls a defendant's state of mind into question, it does
not readily lend itself to summary disposition. 122 The Court stated, however, that because
the case at bar did not present an actual malice issue, the propriety of dealing with state
" 6 Nader, 408 A.2d at 47.
117 See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts' reasons for
granting summary judgment in actual malice cases.
"" See Note, supra note 98, at 125 (the statement that the importance of free speech makes
summary judgment the rule fails to make explicit the reasoning that the importance of free speech
dictates the high standard required to prove liability, and the high standard, in turn, makes summary
judgment the rule).
12 See Note, supra note 98, at 124-25 ("filn granting summary judgment courts often appear
to rely on the first amendment considerations underlying (New York Times]. More accurately, how-
ever, the decisions are based on the lack of evidence of the requisite degree and recognition that
unnecessary trials hinder free expression.").
12 " 443 U.S. 111,120 n.9 (1979).
' 2 ' See supra note 106 and accompanying text fur a lower court description of the so-called
rule.
122 443 U.S. at 120 11.9. The Court reversed a grant of summary judgment for defendant on
the ground that the plaintiff was not a public figure and thus did not have to show actual malice.
Id. at 136.
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of mind issues in a summary procedure was not before it. The Court declined to pursue
the issue of proof further. 123
While the Hutchinson Court, in dictum, questioned the propriety of granting sum-
mary judgment in an actual malice case, it provided no guidance to the lower courts as
to exactly what was improper. 124 The possibilities as to what practice was being disap-
proved included the Wasserman view that the trial judge personally weigh the evidence
in actual malice cases, the Guam use of the "convincing clarity" standard at the summary
judgment stage, or the use of summary judgment at all in state of mind cases. 125 Reaction
to the Hutchinson dictum was varied. To some courts, footnote nine presented a bar to
the use of summary judginent. 1 2 6 In the 1979 case of Church of Scientology of California v.
Siegelman, for instance, the Southern District Court of New York felt "constrained, in
view of the [Hutchinson] footnote, to deny the motion" 127 even though the plaintiff's
evidence was "far from convincing." 23 In the 1979 case of Hart v. Playboy Enterprises,
Inc., the District Court of Kansas said that proof of actual malice could not be prejudged
at the summary judgment stage. 129
For many of the courts interpreting Hutchinson, however, summary judgment in
actual malice cases, while not the rule, was not the exception.'" In general, courts
adopted what they considered a neutral rule in attempting to heed both the Hutchinson
caution and the New York Times actual malice standard.' 51 Under the neutral approach,
courts continued to grant summary judgment in favor of defamation defendants, not
because of a special procedural concern for first amendment rights, but because they
continued to require the plaintiff to meet the "clear and convincing" evidence standard
at the summary judgment stage.
In the 1980 case of Yiamouyiannis v. Consumer's Union, an actual malice case, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals understood Hutchinson as calling for a neutral approach,
under which neither the grant nor the denial of a motion for summary judgment was
preferred.'" The Yiamouyiannis court stated that defamation actions, for procedural
purposes, would be treated no differently from other actions, and that any "chilling
effect" on first amendment rights caused by fear of defending a lawsuit would be
u3 Id. at 120 n.9.
124 Comment, supra note 103, at 489.
'" See id. at 489 n.124.
I " Id.
'27 475 F. Supp. 950, 956 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
' 2 " Id. at 955.
I " 5 MEDIA L. REP. (SNA) 1811, 1814 (D. Kan. 1979).
xr See The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note 6, at 712. One study showed that post-Hutchinson
courts granted summary judgment on the issue of actual malice almost as often as did pre-Hutchinson
courts. Louis noted survey evidence that, after Hutchinson, approximately 75% of all motions for
summary judgment were granted to defamation defendants in actual malice cases. Id. at 711 n,29.
See id. at 710 n.23 for pre-Huiehinson statistics.
Schultz v. Newsweek, Inc., 668 F.2d 911, 917 (6th Cir. 1982); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932, 940 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980);
Nader v. deToledano, 408 A.2d 31, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1979), tent. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Lawrence
v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634, 638-39 (10th Cir. 1981); Brophy v. Philadelphia Newspapers Inc., 281 Pa.
Super. Ct. 588, 599-601, 422 A.2d 625, 631-32 (1980); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v.
Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 231, 396 N.E.2d 996, 1003 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
935 (1980). See also Comment, supra note 103, at 495-96.
m 619 F.2d 932, 940 (al Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
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disregarded in deciding whether to proceed to trial.'" However, the plaintiff in Yiamo-
uyiannis, still required to prove actual malice with convincing clarity, was unable to defeat
the defendant's motion for summary judgment in spite of the neutral rule.' 54 The
Yiamouyiannis court affirmed the grant of summary judgment and held that "no reason-
able jury could find with convincing clarity" that the defendant acted with actual mal-
ice.'" Thus, even under a neutral standard neither favoring nor disfavoring summary
judgment in actual malice cases, and disregarding the "chilling effects" of defending a
lawsuit, the court in Yiamouyiannis required "clear and convincing" proof at the summary
judgment level.'"
Similarly, in the 1979 case of Nader v. de Toledano, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, in formulating a neutral standard for consideration of summary judgment
motions in actual malice cases, held that the same principles applicable to normal sum-
mary judgment motions are applicable to such motions when made in a public figure
libel action.'" The Nader court rejected the Wasserman view — which granted special
procedural protections to defamation defendants — as "impermissibly denigrat[ing] the
traditional roles of judge and jury."'" The Nader court rejected the Wasserman view that
it is the judge at the summary judgment stage who must be convinced of actual malice
with "convincing clarity," and agreed with the Guam view that the plaintiff need only
present evidence which shows a genuine issue of material fact from which a reasonable
jury could find actual malice with convincing clarity.'" Thus, the neutral approach as
articulated in Nader did not allow the judge personally to weigh the evidence in order
to afford special procedural protection to libel defendants, but neither did it eliminate
"convincing clarity" as a consideration at the summary judgment stage. '4°
The Supreme Court's assertion in Hutchinson that summary judgment is inappro-
priate in actual malice cases because of state of mind issues did not prevent the courts
from continuing to grant summary judgment in actual malice cases."' Post-Hutchinson
decisions discredited the Wasserman view that first amendment considerations necessi-
tated a departure from normal summary judgment procedures.H 2 Yet, many courts
found that summary judgment was still appropriate in actual malice cases. These courts
adopted a neutral approach, neither favoring nor disfavoring the grant of summary
judgment for the defendant.'" Under the neutral approach, the trial judge would view
the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and determine whether a reasonable
jury could have found actual malice with convincing clarity.'" Thus, even under a neutral
'" Id.
' 34 Id.
In Id. at 940, 942.
1 " Id. at 940.
137 408 A.2d 31, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
' 58 1d. at 49.
'" Id.
' 45 Id. See also Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F.2d 375, 381 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 964 (1981). Other courts expressly have not included the "convincing clarity" standard in the
summary judgment standard. See e.g., Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 441 F.2d 378, 379-80 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Arber v. Stahlin, 382 Mich. 300, 308-09, 170 N.W.2d 45, 49
(1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 924 (1970).
14 ' See supra notes 130-40 for a discussion of development of the neutral rule.
"2 See, e.g., Nader, 408 A.2d at 49.
143 See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
74 Nader, 408 A.2d at 49.
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approach the courts needed to consider the heightened evidentiary burden the plaintiff
would bear at trial.
Thus, in two lines of cases, the Supreme Court had cautioned against the use of
summary judgment. The Court believed that both antitrust and actual malice defamation
cases were inappropriate for summary disposition and more appropriate for trial because
of the presence of state of mind issues. In Potter v. Columbia Broadcasting System, the Court
cautioned against the use of summary judgment in antitrust litigation." 5 This caution
led many lower courts to treat antitrust defendants categorically for summary judgment
purposes by uniformly denying summary judgment because of the complexity and nature
of proof required to prove conspiracy."" In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, the Court cautioned
against granting summary judgment in actual malice cases." 7 The caution was the Court's
response to a lower court's assertion that granting summary judgment for actual malice
defamation defendants was the rule. The categorical treatment in favor of actual malice
defamation defendants prior to Hutchinson arose out of first amendment concerns about
the chilling effects on free speech of both a trial and the heightened burden of proof.' 4 "
Courts and commentators criticized the view embodied in Poller and Hutchinson that
summary judgment was inappropriate in cases involving state of mind, motive, or in-
tent."" They argued that the Court's restrictive reading of Rule 56 impeded its purpose
of eliminating needless trials and urged that the Rule should he applied to every kind
of case without favor or disfavor.L" Yet in spite of the dissatisfaction with the doctrine
of Hutchinson and Puller, the views expressed in dicta in those opinions remained the
traditional summary judgment doctrine.
I I. TOWARD A NEW SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOCTRINE: MATSUSHITA V. ZENITH, ANDERSON
V. LIBERTY LOBBY AND CELOTEX CORP. v. CATRETT
During the 1986 Term, the Supreme Court reexamined the standards for granting
summary judgment. Specifically, in the areas of antitrust and libel, the Court examined
the burden of proof a plaintiff opposing a motion for summary judgment must meet in
order to demonstrate a genuine factual issue for trial. More generally, the Court outlined
the burden of production on both the defendant bringing a motion for summary
judgment, and on the plaintiff' opposing the motion.
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the Court, without citing
Potter, rejected the notion that some doubt as to the material facts could defeat a Rule
56 motion in an antitrust case. 151 In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Court rejected reliance
on either Poller or Hutchinson to preclude summary judgment where actual malice, a
state of mind issue, was present. 152 In Anderson and Matsushita, the Court not only found
14 ' 368 U.S. at 473.
L46 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of lower court reaction to
Poller.
147 443 U.S. at 120 n.9.
148 See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of' the liberal grant of
summary judgment in actual malice cases because of first amendment concerns.
" See, e.g., Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 780, 809- 10; The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note
6, at 716, 721; A Critical Analysis, supra note 6, at 765-66.
1" See, e.g., Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 809- 10; The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note 6, at
720-22; A Critical Analysis, supra note 6, at 767,769.
I51 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).
11  Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2514 & n.7,
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summary judgment appropriate notwithstanding the presence of state of mind issues,
but set an exacting burden of proof for demonstrating a genuine issue that the plaintiff
must meet in order to proceed to trial.
The third case, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 155 did not raise state of mind issues but it is
an important case in the Court's development of a summary judgment doctrine. Colotex
effectively challenges the party with the burden of proof at trial to demonstrate a genuine
need for trial. The Court held that where the plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient
showing on an element essential to her case, and on which she has the burden of proof
at trial, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law)." These three cases
are now considered in more depth.
A. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, the Court considered
the standard district courts must apply when ruling on a motion for summary judgment
in an antitrust conspiracy case.' 55 The Court reversed the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's
denial of summary judgment, holding that "if the factual context renders respondents'
claim implausible — if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense — respon-
dents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than
would otherwise be necessary."'m The Court further held that unless respondents show
"that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of
independent [lawful] action,"'m summary judgment should be granted.'"
Matsushita was a complex case.' 59 The plaintiffs/respondents were Zenith Radio
Corporation (Zenith) and National Union Electric Corporation (NUE), American firms
that manufacture and sell television sets. 150 The defendants/petitioners were Japanese
manufacturers of consumer electronic products (CEP's) and American firms, controlled
by Japanese parents, that sell Japanese manufactured products in Japan and the United
States.' 51 The alleged conspiracy began as early as 1953,'" was in full operation by the
late 1960's,' 55 and involved twenty-four corporate defendants.' 61
The alleged conspiracy to drive American firms from the American CEP market
involved a scheme to fix and maintain artificially high prices for television receivers sold
by defendants in Japan and to fix and maintain low prices for television receivers
exported to and sold in the United States.' 65 The low prices allegedly produced substan-
tial losses for Zenith and NUE.' 56 The plaintiffs claimed the scheme violated Sections 1
155
 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
154 Id. at 2552-53.
155 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
' 56 1d. at 1362, 1356.
157 Id. at 1357.
158 Id.
155 See Laufer, supra note 4, at p.l, col. 1—p.3, col. 1. Stating the facts of Matsushita is a "daunting
task." Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1351.






 Id. at 1352 n.4.
165 Id. at 1351 (citing in Re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1983)).
166 Id.
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and 2 of the Sherman Act. t67 Suit was filed in 1974, 168 and after years of detailed
discovery 169 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
delivered a 217-page opinion granting summary judgment to defendants, finding that
the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the alleged
conspiracy. 176
In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court found
that any inference of conspiracy was unreasonable because some of the evidence sug-
gested that the defendants' conspiracy did not injure the plaintiffs, and the most direct
evidence on the alleged price-cutting conspiracy did not rebut the more plausible infer-
ence of nonconspiratorial, competitive pricing behavior. 171 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed, 172 finding that a reasonable fact finder could find a conspiracy
based on both direct and circumstantial evidence.'"
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals applied the wrong
standard for determining a genuine issue of fact in an antitrust case. 174 The Court stated
that the mere inference of wrongdoing is not enough,'" and that to survive a motion
for summary judgment or prevail on a motion for a directed verdict in an antitrust case,
a plaintiff must present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged
conspirators acted independently.' 76 Under this standard, the inference of conspiracy
must be reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or
nonharmful collusive action. 177 According to the Court, a judge ruling on a motion for
summary judgment in an antitrust case must examine the plausibility of the plaintiff's
claim and, if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense, the plaintiff must
present more persuasive evidence than otherwise would be necessary.'"
167 Id. at 1351-52. Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal every contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. 1 (1982). Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes
monopolies, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
1611 Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1351.
169 1d. at 1352.
17° Id.
171 Id. at 1352.
172 In Re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom., Mat-
sushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). The plaintiffs, National Union
Electric Corporation (NUE) and Zenith Radio Corporation (Zenith) originally filed separate com-
plaints which were eventually consolidated under a new name. Id. at 250. The NUE complaint was
filed in the District of New Jersey in December 1970. Id. The Zenith complaint, filed in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in September 1974, named the same defendants as did the NUE complaint,
with a few additions. Id. On January 10, 1975, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation trans-
ferred the NUE case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings with the Zenith case. Id.
172 Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d at 304-05.
174 Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1354.
175
 Id. at 1362.
176 Id. at 1357 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
' 77 Id.
178 Id. at 1356. The Court said that such implausibility was the case in Cities Service. In that case,
said the Court, the defendant's refusal to deal might have, in isolation, sufficed to create a triable
issue, but that the refusal to deal had to be evaluated in its factual context. Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at
1356. That factual context included defendant's independent interest and economic factors strongly
suggesting that the defendant had no motive to join the alleged conspiracy. Id. Evaluated in that
context, the refusal to deal could not by itself support a finding of antitrust liability. Id.
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The Court acknowledged the traditional summary judgment notion that inferences
drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.' 79
 The Court added, however, that antitrust law itself limits the permissible infer-
ences a court can draw from ambiguous evidence, 18° thus limiting the "favorable" treat-
ment a court could give a plaintiff in an antitrust case. In Matsushita, the Court reiterated
its earlier holding in the 1984 case of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., a case
alleging a vertical price-fixing conspiracy.' 81 In Monsanto, the Court held that conduct
which is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not,
standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. 182
 Instead, the plaintiff
must present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators
acted independently. 183
 Thus, in an antitrust case a plaintiff must show a plausible,
rational motive to conspire and must introduce evidence which not only supports the
inference of conspiracy but which tends to exclude the possibility of nonconspiratorial
behavior.
Applying these standards, the Matsushita Court found that because predatory pricing
was "economically senseless," 184 there was no rational motive to conspire. The .Court
reasoned that such a lack of motive bears on the range of permissible conclusions that
might be drawn from ambiguous evidence.'" The Court concluded that in the absence
of any rational motive to conspire, the evidence relied on by the Third Circuit —
defendants' pricing practices, their conduct in the Japanese market, and their agreements
respecting price and distribution in the American market — was insufficient to create a
genuine issue for trial.'"
Thus, the Court found that summary judgment was not only appropriate in a
complex antitrust case where motive and intent played leading roles, but also was
mandated unless plaintiff could show a plausible economic motive to conspire, coupled
with persuasive evidence of conspiracy tending to exclude the possibility of permissible
competitive behavior. 187
 Failing to refer to its decision in Poller, and in contrast to that
Court's admonition that "summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex
antitrust litigation,"'" the Matsushita Court demanded that the plaintiff "do more than
' 79 hi. at 1356-57.
180 Id. at 1357.
im 465 U.S. 752,755 (1984).
1 82 Id. at 764,
Id.
184 Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1362. The Court said:
Here, the conduct in question consists largely of (i) pricing at levels that succeeded in
taking business away from respondents, and (ii) arrangements that may have limited
petitioners' ability to compete with each other (and thus kept prices from going even
lower). This conduct suggests either that petitioners behaved competitively, or that
petitioners conspired to raise prices. Neither possibility is consistent with an agreement
among 21 companies to price below market levels. Moreover, the predatory pricing
scheme that this conduct is said to prove is one that makes no practical sense: it calls
for petitioners to destroy companies larger and better established than themselves, a
goal that remains far distant more than two decades after the conspiracy's birth.
Id. at 1361.
tae
t ae Id. at 1362.
"" 7 Id.
L8g Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 368 U.S. 464,473 (1962).
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simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."'" Rather,
stated the Court, there must be "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial." 190
 The Matsushita Court thus held that ambiguous evidence of conspiracy will not
suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 191
The Court maintained that a rule limiting the inferences which may be drawn from
ambiguous evidence of conspiracy would not be harmful to competitive conduct. 192 The
Court concluded instead that a rule allowing fact Finders to infer conspiracy despite the
implausibility of the evidence would pose a danger to competitive conduct because the
effect of such inferences often is to deter pro-competitive conduct. 193 As an example,
the Court noted that price cutting in order to increase business is the very essence of
competition, and a mistaken inference of conspiracy would chill the very conduct the
antitrust laws were designed to protect.'" After Matsushita, the Court thus demands that
courts ruling on a summary judgment motion in a case alleging conspiracy examine
more searchingly the plausibility of inferences and the complexities of economic behav-
ior. 195
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in which he faulted the majority opinion
on much the same grounds as did the dissenting opinions in Anderson. According to
Justice White, the Court's confusing and inconsistent statements regarding the standards
for granting summary judgment invade the fact finder's province.'" In particular, Justice
White stated that the majority's language regarding plausibility suggested that a judge
hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment should exceed the traditional
bounds of summary judgment inquiry and weigh the evidence personally.' 97 The re-
quirement that a judge. hearing a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case,
must determine if the evidence makes the inference of conspiracy more probable than
not, said Justice White, overturned settled law.'" justice White did not, however, rely
on or even cite to Poller as a justification for denying summary judgment.'"
I " Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.
1" Id. (emphasis in original).
191 Id. at 1362.
' 92 Id, at 1360.
193 Id.
1 " Id.
197 See id. at 1356 (purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the
proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial).
196 Id. at 1362-63 (White, J„ dissenting). Justice White criticized the majority for preferring its
own economic theorizing to that of the plaintiff's expert, id. at 1365 (White, J., dissenting), and for
making assumptions, such as that defendants favored profit maximization over growth, which
should be argued to the fact finder and not decided by the court. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 1363 (Whited.. dissenting). Such a proposition, said Justice White, was not supported
by either Cities Service or Monsanto, cases which he believed "held that a particular piece of evidence
standing alone was insufficiently probative to justify sending the case to the jury," Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
198 Id. at 1363-64 (White, J., dissenting).
igg The failure of either the majority or the dissent to mention Poller has been described as "a
silence which speaks volumes about the Court's intentions." Apex Oil Co. v. Di Mauro, 641 F. Supp.
1246, 1256 (S.D,N.Y. 1986). In Apex, a case alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, id. at 1253, the plaintiff relied heavily on the Puller caution for the proposition that the Court
could not have meant what it said in Matsushita, and that summary judgment must thus be used
sparingly in antitrust cases. Id. at 1256.
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In light of the Matsushita decision, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York in the 1986 case of Apex Oil Co. v. Di Mauro considered the propriety of
granting summary judgment in the antitrust context and concluded that summary judg-
ment is available in large antitrust conspiracy cases. 2" The plaintiffs in Apex, a case
involving the commodities market, alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act,201 The Apex court found that the nature of a conspiracy case demands that, on a
motion for summary judgment, the trial court give searching scrutiny to the inferences
available from ambiguous evidence. 2" The Apex court attributed the marked change
evidenced in Matsushita to the onslaught of massive antitrust litigation during the twenty-
five years since Poller was decided, an onslaught which the court asserted places great
stress on judicial resources. 205 The Apex court found, in both Anderson and Celotex Corp.
v. Calrett, further encouragement for district courts to utilize the summary judgment
procedure. 2" The Apex decision thus interprets the three Supreme Court decisions as
changing the status of Rule 56 to a more favored procedure for piercing the pleadings
and eliminating needless trials from an overburdened judicial systcm. 202
B. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
In the 1986 case of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Supreme Court squarely addressed
the question of the burden of proof a plaintiff must meet at the summary judgment
stage on the issue of actual malice under New York Times. 206 The case traced its roots to
October 1981, when the magazine The Investigator ran two articles edited by defendant
Andersort.202 The articles portrayed the plaintiffs Willis Carto and Liberty Lobby as neo-
Nazi, fascist, anti-Semitic, and racist. 2"
Carto and Liberty Lobby sued the editor Anderson, the author of the articlës, and
Investigator Publishing Company for libel in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. 2" The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that
Liberty Lobby and Carto were "limited-purpose public figures," and therefore, had to
200 Id.
21) 1 Id. at 1253.
212 Id. at 1255-57. The court in Apex granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims.
Id. at 1286.
"2 1d. at 1256.
2"'" Id. at 1257.
" See id. at 1256-57.
211" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2508 (1986).
007 Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201. 205 (D.D.C. 1983). The articles were
entitled "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler." Id. One
article detailed the history of the plaintiff Liberty Lobby and its chief lobbyist, Carto. Id. Liberty
Lobby is a not-for-profit corporation, self-described as "the first citizens' lobby in the United States,"
whose avowed purpose is to advocate and promote "patriotism, nationalism, lawfulness, protection
of the national interests of the United States and the economic interests of its citizens, and strict
adherence to the United States constitution and the Form of government it establishes." Id. A second
article concerned the late author and lawyer, Yockey, who had inspired an underground fascist
movement. Pretrial Evidence Standard To Be Tested, 9 News MEDIA & L. 5 (1985). An introductory
article, signed by "The Editors" was entitled "America's Neo-Nazi Underground: Did Mein Kampf
Spawn Yockey's Imperium, a Book Revived by Carto's Liberty Lobby?" Anderson, 562 F. Supp. at
205.
2" Anderson,.562 F. Supp. at 205.
2" Id.
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prove actual malice by "clear and convincing proof" in order to prevail at trial."° The
trial judge ruled that the plaintiffs were "limited-purpose public figures" based on their
avowed purpose to advocate and promote patriotism and nationalism, their active in-
volvement in publishing a. newspaper, and in broadcasting both radio commentary and
a television news show. 2 " The trial judge found, however, that because the author had
"thoroughly investigated and researched the articles," the plaintiff was unable to prove
the existence of actual malice. 2 ' 2 This finding justified the granting of summary judgment
for the defendants."' In so ruling, the trial judge cited Judge Wright's concurring
opinion in Wasserman for the proposition that actual malice is a constitutional issue to be
decided in the first instance by the trial judge. 2 ' 4 This was the test that had been rejected
by courts which adopted the neutral rule in response to the Hutchinson dictum. 215
Carto and Liberty Lobby appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.216 The appellate court considered whether the requirement of "con-
vincing clarity" applied at the summary judgment stage, or whether a lesser burden of
proof was sufficient."' The Supreme Court did not address this issue in Htachinson.218
While some courts believed that after Hutchinson the requirement of "convincing clarity"
did not apply at the summary judgment stage, 219 courts which adopted the neutral rule
of Nader assumed that the "clear and convincing" standard applied at every stage of
litigation at which liability for actual malice libel could be determined. 22°
Despite this assumption in Nader, the court of appeals held that the "convincing
clarity" standard did not have to be met at the summary judgment stage in order to
defeat the defendant's motion. 221 The appellate court reasoned that imposing the in-
creased burden of proof at the summary judgment stage would change the threshold
inquiry from a search for minimum facts supporting the plaintiff's case to an evaluation
of the weight of those facts. 222 The appellate court concluded that this would force the
plaintiff to present his entire case prematurely in pretrial affidavits and depositions. 223
In further support of its position, the appellate court stated that there would be
"slim basis" for the Supreme Court's statement in Hutchinson that actual malice does not
lend itself readily to summary judgment if, in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff must establish an arguably "clear and convincing" case. 224 The
court apparently thought that if the "clear and convincing" standard applied at the
summary judgment stage, actual malice would lend itself readily to summary judgment.
21 " Id. at 207. In addition, defendants claimed that Carto and Liberty Lobby were "libel-proof"




21 ' Id. at 209.
z 15 Id.
214 Id, See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Wasserman standard.
213 Sec supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the neutral rule.
II " Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
2 " Id. at 1566.
218 See supra notes 120-23 for a discussion of Hutchinson.
219 See, Note, supra note 98, at 126 n.71.
220 See Comment, supra note 103, at 996-97.




768	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 28:747
For at this premature stage, said the court, a plaintiff would not be able to marshall the
evidence required to meet the heightened evidentiary burden. 225
The court of appeals acknowledged yet rejected the rule set forth in Yiamouyiannis
and Nader under which the trial judge must view the record in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff and determine whether a reasonable jury could have found actual malice
with convincing darit y.226 Those courts, said the court of appeals, were addressing the
question of whether the normal summary judgment standard applied, as opposed to
some test more favorable to the defendant. 227 They were not addressing, however, the
question of to what burden of proof the standard should be applied.228 Moreover, the
court of appeals found that those decisions rested upon lack of evidence of malice, not
upon lack of "convincing clarity" in that evidence. 225
The appellate court, having rejected the evidentiary requirement of "convincing
clarity" at the summary judgment stage, also rejected the requirement of "independent
judicial determination" of the ultimate issue of actual malice at the summary judgment
stage. 23° The appellate court found that "independent judicial determination" was in-
compatible with the preliminary nature of the summary judgment inquiry."' The court
traced the requirement of "independent judicial determination" to Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, a case not cited by the trial judge which ruled on the motion for summary
judgment. 232 In Bose, the Supreme Court held that in cases raising first amendment
issues, an appellate court must decide independently whether the evidence in the record
is sufficient to find that actual malice has been shown with "convincing clarity." 233 Bose
thus required "independent judicial determination" not at the summary judgment stage,
but at the appellate level after a bench trial on the issue of liability in an actual malice
case.22 ' Nonetheless, the appellate court in Anderson concluded that the Bose requirement
of an independent judicial determination of actual malice was unwarranted at the sum-
mary judgment stage because it would require the plaintiff to present his or her full
case prematurely. 235
The Anderson court of appeals held that to overcome a motion for summary judg-
ment a plaintiff only has to offer a "minimum amount of evidence that could persuade
a reasonable person." 235 The court of appeals held that courts should apply the "clear
and convincing" burden of proof and exercise "independent judicial determination" of
225 Id. The court analogized the application of the "clear and convincing" evidence standard in
actual malice cases to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" constitutional standard in criminal cases,
noting that "probable cause" is sufficient to take the case to trial and that the heightened evidentiary
standard only applies after the government has had an opportunity to present its full case. Id. at
1570-71.
225 Id, at 1571. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of Yiamouyiannis
and Nader.
227 The court characterized the normal test as a test of "could a reasonable jury find." Anderson,
746 F.2d at 1571.
225 Id.
279 Id.
255 Anderson, 746 F.2d at 1571.
221 Id. at 1571.
252 Id.




746 F.2d at 1571.
235 Id.
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the ultimate issue of actual malice only after the plaintiff has had an opportunity to
present all of the evidence." 7 The court expressly agreed with the two-stage approach
set forth by Judge Wright in Wasserman.ne Thus, the appellate court apparently inter-
preted Wasserman to require judicial determination of whether actual malice has been
shown with "convincing clarity" only after the plaintiff has presented its full case at trial
and the judge is ruling on a motion for a directed verdict. 299 The court of appeals then
held that with respect to at least nine of the thirty allegedly defamatory statements,
summary judgment had been improperly granted because "a jury could reasonably
conclude that the . . . allegations were defamatory, false, and made with actual malice." 24 0
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals did not apply the
correct standard in reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment. 2" The
Court held that a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment in an actual malice
case must be guided by the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard in determining
whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists. 242 The Court thus incorporated the
evidentiary standard applicable at trial into the summary judgment determination.
The Court began its analysis of Anderson by stating that by its very terms Rule 56(c) 243
provides that the mere existence of "some" alleged factual dispute between the parties
is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment; instead, there must be a
genuine issue of material fact. 2" Then, addressing the requirement of materiality, the
Court stated that the substantive law will identify which facts are materia1. 245 Materiality,
said the Court, is only a criterion for categorizing factual disputes, not a criterion for
evaluating the evidentiary standards which apply to those disputes. 20 The materiality
question is thus separate. from the question of the evidentiary standard's incorporation
into the summary judgment determination. 247
The Court noted that it is the question of whether an issue is "genuine" which
incorporates the evidentiary standard into the summary judgment determination. 248 The
Court defined a dispute as "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 249 The Court said that this standard
mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a),
which requires the trial judge to "direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can
233 Id.
239 Id. The Court quoted the following language from Judge Wright's concurring opinion:
Unless the court finds, on the basis of pretrial affidavits, depositions or other docu-
mentary evidence, that the plaintiff can prove actual malice in the Times sense, it
should grant summary judgment for the defendant .. , If the case survives the
defendant's summary judgment motion, the trial court at the close of the plaintiff's
case must decide whether actual malice has been shown with "convincing clarity."
Id. (quoting Wasserman, 424 F.2d at 922).
939 See Comment, supra note 103, at n.91.
249
 Anderson, 746 F.2d at 1577.
241 Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2508.
242
 Id. at 2515.
2" Sec text accompanying note 9 for the text of Rule 56(c).
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be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." 250 The inquiry in each, stated the
Court, is whether there is sufficient disagreement as to the truth to require submission
to a jury, or whether the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law."'
The Court noted that this inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence necessarily
implicates the substantive evidentiary burden that would apply at tria1. 252 Whether a jury
could reasonably find for either party, according to the Court, can only be defined by
the criteria governing what evidence would enable the jury to find for either the plaintiff
or the defendant."s The reasonableness of a jury's ultimate decision must be measured
by the applicable evidentiary standards that govern its deliberations 254 The judge ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, said the Court, must keep in mind the quantum
and quality of proof necessary to prove actual malice,"' and "must view the evidence
presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." 66 The Court
stressed that such a standard does not denigrate the role of the jury, and that credibility
determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from
the facts remain jury functions."' The Court further stated that the trial judge should
act with caution in granting summary judgment, reasoning that where there is reason
to believe that the better course is to proceed to trial, the motion should be denied. 258
The Court dealt with Hutchinson in a footnote, stating that Hutchinson's footnote nine
merely acknowledged the Court's general reluctance to grant special procedural protec-
tions to defendants in libel cases in addition to the constitutional protections embodied
in the substantive law. 259 The Court thus interpreted its holding in Anderson — that the
applicable evidentiary standard applies at the summary judgment stage — as broad
enough to encompass summary judgment for all litigants. Consequently, Rule 56 does
not afford special procedural protection for libel defendants. 26° The Court's denial of
special procedural protections for one type of litigant thus makes the incorporation of
the substantive evidentiary standard into the summary judgment determination the
"neutral rule," neither favoring nor disfavoring a particular class of litigants."'
As the Court would not allow plaintiffs to rely on Hutchinson for the proposition
that summary judgment was inappropriate specifically in libel cases, neither would it
allow plaintiffs to rely on Poller for the proposition that state of mind issues were
23° Id. at 2511.
25 ' Id, at 2512.
252 Id.







239 /d. at 2514 n.7 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,790-91 (1984)).
260 See 106 S. Ct. at 2515 11.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court's holding is not confined in its
application to first amendment cases; the holding'changes summary judgment procedure for all •
litigants, regardless of the substantive nature of the underlying litigation).
26 ' The courts in Yiamouyiannis and Nader thus would appear to have given the Hutchinson
caution all it was due in adopting a neutral rule which nonetheless required "clear and convincing"
proof at the summary judgment stage. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text for a




inappropriate generally for summary disposition. 262 Pollen said the Court, should not be
read to hold that a plaintiff could defeat a motion for summary judgment in a libel or
conspiracy case merely by asserting that the jury might disbelieve the defendant's wit-
nesses on the state of mind issues. 20 Rather, said the Court, the plaintiff has the burden
of producing evidence that would support a jury verdict. 2" Under Rule 56(e) 265 noted
the Court, the party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may
not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his or her pleadings, but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 266 Citing Cities Service, 267 the
Court maintained that the plaintiff cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment
without offering "any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint." 2"
The plaintiff, said the Court, must present affirmative evidence from which a jury might
return a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. 269 This proposition holds even where the evidence
is likely to be within the possession of the defendant, 27° as long as the plaintiff has had
a full opportunity to conduct discovery. 27 i After Anderson, the standard governing the
grant of summary judgment for all litigants will be whether a jury could reasonably find
for the plaintiff on the evidence presented viewed in light of the substantive evidentiary
burden. 212
Justice Brennan dissented from the majority opinion in Anderson and characterized
it as an invitation, or an instruction, to the trial court to weigh the evidence as a juror
would at tria1. 2" In justice Brennan's view, a direction to the judge to bear in mind the
262 Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2514.
26! Id. The Court thus implied that Poller could no longer offer support for the categorical
treatment of state of mind cases, under which judges ruling on summary judgment motions
preferred trial, even where the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence supporting his or her claim
and was unlikely to succeed at trial. See Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2514. See also Apex, 641 F. Supp. at
1256, discussed supra notes 200-415 ("However true that sentiment [in Pallet] may have been in
1962, it is not true today.") Id.
264 Id.
266 Rule 56(e) provides that:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment,
if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Fen. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
266
	 106 S. Ct. at 2514.
26' See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cities Service.
268 Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2514.
266 Id.
276 In Poller, one of the reasons given for the sparing use of summary judgment was that "the
proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators." Pollen 368 U.S. at 473.
"'Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2514.
2/51d. at 2512. As a result, the focus is on the character of the evidence presented, and not on
the character of the claim.
277 Id. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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"caliber and quality" of evidence sufficient to meet the "quantum" of proof required is
a direction to weigh the evidence. 224 Justice Brennan expressed concern that this pro-
cedure would transform the summary judgment process into a "full blown paper trial
on the merits,""3 and would undermine the constitutional rights of civil litigants to a
jury trial . 276
In Justice Brennan's view, to defeat a motion for summary judgment a plaintiff
need present only evidence which, either directly or by permissible inference, 222 supports
all the elements the plaintiff needs to prove in order to prevail on the claim. 278
 The role
of the fact finder, said Justice Brennan, is to determine whether the evidence is "clear
and convincing" or proves a point by a mere preponderance. 279
Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissenting opinion, joined by then Chief Justice
Burger, in which he said that the decision to "engraft" the standard of proof applicable
to a fact finder onto the law governing summary judgment was an exercise in "intellectual
tidiness" which would do more mischief than benefit Justice Rehnquist objected to
what he believed were special procedural protections for libel defendants, 281 and pre-
dicted that the decisions of trial judges on summary judgment motions in libel cases
would be more erratic and inconsistent than before. 282
Justice Rehnquist based his objection on the concern that the Court created a new
summary judgment standard without providing any guidelines as to how the standard
would be applied in a given case 289
 In Justice Rehnquist's opinion, the differentiated
burdens of proof applicable to civil and criminal cases — preponderance of the evidence,
clear and convincing evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt — do not convey a logical
or analytical message easily applied to a procedural motion, but instead convey "almost
a state of mind" 284 whose effect on the fact finder may be "unknowable." Y83
C. Celolex Corp. v. Catrett
Matsushita and Anderson addressed the burden of proof required at the summary
judgment stage in antitrust and actual malice defamation cases. In Matsushita and An-
derson, the Court effectively removed doctrinal barriers to the use of summary judgment
274 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
275
	 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
276 Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2" These inferences are a product of the substantive law underlying the claim. Id. (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
278 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28U Id. at 2520, 2522-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
281 Id. at 2521 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Calder v. Jones, 965 U.S. 783 (1984)). But see
supra note 260 for Justice Brennan's opinion that the Court's holding changes summary judgment
procedures for all litigants.
282 Id, at 2523 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
288 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
284 Id. at 2522 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
288 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1979)).
Lower court judges have begun to apply the teaching of Anderson. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Rizzuto v. Nereus Products Co. granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment in an actual malice case where plaintiffs had not offered "an iota of evidence"
from which a jury could find that the plaintiffs proved actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence. 641 F. Supp. 473, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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in state of mind cases. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, a case decided on the same day as
Anderson, the Court addressed the broader question of the production of evidence burden
placed on the moving and nonmoving party by Rule 56 in all cases.'"
In Celotex, a products liability case, plaintiff Catrett claimed that her husband's death
resulted from exposure to products containing asbestos manufactured or distributed by,
among others, defendant Celotex." 7 Celotex, without introducing any documentary
evidence, filed a motion for summary judgment.'" Celotex argued that summary judg-
ment was proper because the plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence that any
Celotex product was the proximate cause of death, and more particularly, that the
plaintiff had failed to identify any witnesses who could testify about the decedent's
exposure to the plaintiff's products despite interrogatories specifically requesting such
in formation . 289
In response, the plaintiff produced three documents, all tending to establish that
the decedent had been exposed to the petitioner's products during 1970-71. 290 The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant because there was no show-
ing that the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant's products within the statutory
period."'" The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding
that the defendant's summary judgment motion was rendered "fatally defective" by the
fact that the defendant "made no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits
or otherwise, to support its motion.""n While acknowledging that the defendant would
have difficulty in "proving the negative"293 that the plaintiff had not been exposed to
the defendant's products, the court stated that the defendant's "barebones approach"
would not suffice to support a motion for summary judgment."'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the moving party is not required to
support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's
2
 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2551, 2552-53 (1986).
2
"7 Id. at 2551.
2E18 Catrett v. jlohits-Manville Sales Corp„ 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
'9 Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2551.
21111 Id.
291 Id. The district court ruled from the bench and there was no written opinion. Calreit, 756
F.2d at 183 n,3.
2=12 Id. at 184 (emphasis in original).
2413 Id.
294 Id. at 185. Judge Bork dissented, saying "[t]he majority errs in supposing that a party seeking
summary judgment must always make an affirmative evidentiary showing, even in cases where
there is not a triable, factual dispute." Id. at 188 (Bork, J., dissenting). Analogizing a grant of
summary judgment to a directed verdict, Judge Bork said "a directed verdict would clearly be
required since the plaintiff' lacks any admissible evidence of causation, an essential element of her
case." Id. (Bork, J., dissenting). Judge Bork also based his conclusion on the power of a trial judge
to grant summary judgment sua sponte when he or she notices the absence of a factual dispute, and
the absence is not corrected after notice: "If the district court, on its own motion, may grant
summary judgment whenever it concludes that required evidence cannot be produced, it necessarily
follows that a defendant may obtain summary judgment when it brings that situation to the court's
attention." Id. at 189 (Bork, J., dissenting).
Judge Bork noted the plaintiff's failure to produce any admissible evidence of causation after
two years of preparation. Id. at 191 (Bork, J., dissenting). Seeking to preserve the utility of summary
judgment as a means of disposing of meridess cases which waste trial court time and energy, Judge
Bork concluded: "I understand the judicial impulse to save a plaintiff's case from what may have
been careless preparation, but the deformation of summary judgment procedures is too high a
price to pay for the gratification of that impulse." Id. (Bork, J., dissenting).
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claim. 293 The plain language of Rule 56(c), stated the Court, "mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." 298
The Court stated that summary judgment is appropriate in such a case because there
can be no genuine issue of material fact: "a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts im-
material." 297 The Court reiterated its holding in Anderson that the standard for granting
summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict. 298
In holding that the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits
or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim, the Supreme Court noted that
Rule 56(c) refers to affidavits "if any" and that Rules 56(a) and (b) provide that claimants
and defendants may move for summary judgment "with or without supporting affida-
vits."299 Thus, whether or not the moving party accompanies its motion with affidavits,
the motion should be granted provided that whatever is before the court demonstrates
that the standard for entry of summary judgment under Rule'56(c) is met 3 00 The burden
on the moving party, said the Court, may be discharged by the moving party merely by
pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case, 3 0 1 The nonmoving party, in turn, must designate "specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 3 °2 Such an interpretation, said the Courtv
would allow the summary judgment rule to accomplish its purpose of isolating and
disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses.3°3
895 Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. Because the court of appeals declined to address either the
adequacy of the showing made by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, or whether such a showing, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be sufficient to
carry plaintiff's burden of proof at trial, the Court remanded to the court of appeals to make those
determinations. Id. at 2555.
296 fd. at 2552-53.




"1 Id. at 2554. The Court said its conclusion was bolstered by the fact that district courts are
widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua spotlit., so long as the
losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all her evidence. Id. "It would surely
defy common sense," said the Court, "to hold that the District Court could have entered summary
judgment sua sponte in favor of petitioner in the instant case, but that petitioner's filing of a motion
requesting such a disposition precluded the District Court from ordering it." Id. (citing Catrett v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181,189 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting)).
902 Id. at 2553. The evidence produced by the nonmoving party does not have to be in a form
that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. Id. Rule 56(c) lists the kinds
of evidentiary material permitted, and "it is from this list that one would normally expect the
nonmoving party to make the [required] showing." Id. at 2554.
20 Id:at 2553. The Court explained its language in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(t970), where in reversing a grant of summary judgment in favor of a defendant the Court said
that "both the commentary on and background of the 1963 amendment conclusively show that it
was not intended to modify the burden of the moving party ... to show initially the absence of a
genuine issue concerning any material fact." Id, at 159. The 1963 Amendment added the last two
sentences to Rule 56 (e):
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,
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The Court noted further that because the plaintiff in this case had over a year to
conduct discovery, there could be no serious claim that the plaintiff was "railroaded" by
a premature motion for summary judgment." Any such potential problem, noted the
Court, could be dealt with adequately under Rule 56(f), 305 which allows a summary
judgment motion to be denied, or the hearing on the motion continued, if the nonmoving
party has not had an opportunity to make full discovery."
The Gourt concluded its opinion by expressing its support for the use of Rule 56
in identifying claims and defenses that have no factual basis. 3 ° 7 Summary judgment, said
the Court, is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but a means of securing the "just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."" The Court emphasized that
Rule 56 must be read not only to protect the rights of plaintiffs with genuine claims to
a jury trial on the merits, but also for the rights of defendants who demonstrate prior
to trial that no such genuine claim exists." The Celotex opinion thus expresses due
regard for the rights of all defendants moving for summary judgment, not just for those
defendants formerly disfavored because of the presence of state of mind issues.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE "NEW" SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The standards for granting summary judgment enunciated in Matsushita, Anderson,
and Celotex suggest that the Court increasingly is receptive to the use of Rule 56 for
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
The purpose of the amendment was to overturn a line of cases, chiefly in the Third Circuit,
that had held that a party opposing a summary judgment motion could create a dispute as to a
material fact asserted in an affidavit by the moving party without producing any evidentiary matter
by simply relying on contrary averments in hiS own complaint. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 159 n.20. The
Celotex Court agreed with the statement in Adickes in the literal sense that the 1963 Amendment
was not designed to modify the burden of making the showing generally required under Rule
56(c), Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2554, but refused to construe the language to mean that the burden is
on the moving party to produce evidence shelving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,
even with respect to an issue which the nonmoving party would bear the burden of proof at trial.
Id. The Adickes Court was correct in concluding that the 1963 Amendment was not intended to
reduce the burden on the moving party, but, said the Celotex Court, it is obvious that the Amendment
was not intended to add to that burden. Id. Read otherwise, said the Court, an amendment designed
to facilitate the granting of summary judgment motions would be interpreted to make it more
difficult to grant such motions. Id.
" Id.
305 Rule 56(f) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may
make such other order as is just.
Fen. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
5 °6 Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2554-55.
3 ° 7 Id. at 2555.
"8 Id. See Fen. R. Civ. P. 1,
" Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2555.
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early disposition of claims where no genuine factual issue exists. 31° These three Supreme
Court decisions offer encouragement for the trial courts"' to utilize the summary judg-
ment procedure in all cases, and especially in cases where the propriety of its use has
been unsettled.
More particularly, the Supreme Court has moved away from its restrictive, caution-
ary stance towards summary judgment in cases involving state of mind issues. The
cautions expressed in the Poller dictum in the conspiracy area and in the Hutchinson
footnote in the actual malice area expressed a general disapproval of the use of summary
judgment in cases involving state of mind. Although the concern of the Court regarding
the need for trial in difficult cases involving credibility determinations was legitimate, 312
the categorical approach suggested by Poller and Hutchinson did not give enough regard
to the plaintiff's prospects for success at tria1. 313 As a generalization, the caution against
the use of summary judgment in state of mind cases was a means of protecting plaintiffs
at the pretrial stage where those plaintiffs would have to shoulder a heavy burden of
proof at tria1. 3 " As such, the generalization was rough justice. 3 ' 5 Whereas the substantive
law favored defendants at trial by requiring the plaintiff to meet a heightened evidentiary
burden, the caution against the use of summary judgment in state of mind cases favored
plaintiffs in the pretrial stage by allowing them to proceed to trial, Such "rough justice,"
however, was an improper application of Rule 56 because it prohibited summary judg-
ment even though a particular plaintiff had offered no substantial evidence to support
the claim and had little prospects for success at trial. 316
31 ° See Hoenig, Products Liability: Recent Developments, 196 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 1986 at I , col. 1.
With the Supreme Court's clarification in the Celotex and Anderson cases of the dynamics
of summary judgment practice and its admonition that such motions should be granted
where appropriate, it may now be expected that federal district court judges will act
more confidently in dismissing claims that fall short of the required evidentiary show-
ing on behalf of the party who has the burden of proof on a key issue.
Id.
911
	 supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of' the Apex decision. It is
interesting to note that the Apex decision, citing all three Supreme Court cases and finding encour-
agement from the Supreme Court for the use of summary judgment procedures, is a case arising
in the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit has been perceived in the past as being hostile to summary
judgment disposition. See, e.g., Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 441 F. Supp. 525, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(court notes "the strong policy against summary judgment in this Circuit."). However, the Second
Circuit is trying to dispel that perceived hostility. The Committee on the Pretrial Phase of Civil
Cases of the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, in its recent final report, recommended to
the Circuit's judges that steps be taken to lessen the uncertainty about summary disposition in the
Second Circuit. Second Circuit Committee on the Pretrial Phase of Civil Litigation, at 19. The
report urged the adoption of steps clarifying the application of summary judgment, in order to
provide greater incentive to use summary judgment procedures as an effective device for accelerated
disposition of cases. Id. at 20.
313 See The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note 6, at 714, 722 (suggesting a new summary
judgment doctrine which will accommodate the legitimate concerns that underlie the state of mind
caution).
313 Id. at 720-21 (traditional summary judgment doctrine was denied almost automatically in
state of mind or other cases of unequal access to the evidence without regard to plaintiff's ultimate
prospects for success at trial: "This rigidity developed out of a blind fear that any retreat from a
protective rule might prejudice all such plaintiff's unfairly.").
9 " See id.
316 1d. at 721.
316 See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 478 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting);




The approach articulated in Anderson and Matsushita allows the trial court to question
whether a particular plaintiff in a state of mind case has any prospect for success at
tria1. 317 Under Anderson, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient dis-
agreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law." 318 Under Matsushita the inquiry is whether "the record
taken as a whole could ... lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party." sly This new approach reinvigorates the summary judgment procedure by re-
quiring a more searching inquiry at the pre-trial stage.
The reinvigoration of the summary judgment procedure raises substantive questions
of fairness to plaintiffs and defendants at the pretrial stage. Whereas a cautious use of
summary judgment can be viewed as more fair to plaintiffs by preserving their right to
a jury trial, a more liberal use of summary judgment can be viewed as more fair to
defendants by not requiring them to defend a claim that presents no genuine issues of
fact. Concerns expressed in the dissenting opinions in Matsushita and Anderson about the
effect of a more liberal use of summary judgment on the rights of plaintiffs to a jury
trial reflect a belief that justice is better served by allowing the plaintiff his or her day
in court.32° The majority opinions, on the other hand, reflect the belief that what is
better for the plaintiff is not necessarily better for the administration of justice, or for
the defendant who is put to the expense of a needless tria1. 321 Yet, generalizations about
the fairness of summary judgment procedures to plaintiffs or defendants as a group
does not answer the more important question: as between this plaintiff and this defen-
dant, what is the just disposition of their dispute?
The majority's answer to the question of fairness is that a particular plaintiff is
entitled to proceed to trial only if he or she in fact has demonstrated the existence of a
"genuine" controversy. The new standards require from the plaintiff a more rigorous
demonstration of the "genuineness" of his or her claim. If a genuine claim is demon-
strated, summary judgment will be denied and the plaintiff is entitled to proceed to
trial. 322 Thus, the new standards do not deny a plaintiff his or her right to trial, but they
do require each particular plaintiff to demonstrate that in fact a trial is needed.
Although it is not inconsistent with a principle of justice or fairness that a plaintiff
demonstrate the "genuineness" of his or her claim, it would be unfair to plaintiffs if the
3 " See The Actual Malice Controversy, supra note 6, at 720-21. Louis states that under a more
liberal approach "the court at least may inquire whether the particular plaintiff has any prospect
of success. Such an inquiry will not always result in the entry of summary judgment, but it will
permit the court to ask the relevant question." Id.
It' Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2512. In a similar formulation, one commentator has said: "Some
issues involving state of mind ... may turn on ambiguous inferences and thus be inappropriate for
summary judgment in a particular case. Nonetheless, in many cases the inferences will point in only
one direction, and there is no reason to deny summary judgment in such cases." Sonenshein, supra
note 7, at 809-10.
' 19 Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.
'2° See id. at 1365 (White, J., dissenting); Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 785.
351 See Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2555. See aisa Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 785 ("the court's denial
of a summary judgment motion in these circumstances will force one party to incur needless
litigation expenses, and will force society to bear the burden of ever-increasing delay in the admin-
istration of justice").
3" See Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at '2510 (summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a fact
is genuine; availability of summary judgment turns on whether a proper jury question is presented).
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threshold for "genuineness" were set at a level too high to reach by the available pretrial
steps. The belief that a plaintiff in a state of mind case could demonstrate the genuineness
of his or her claim only through examination of the defendant's witnesses at trial was,
of course, the origin of the caution against the use of summary judgment in state of
mind cases. Yet it is possible, using the available pretrial steps, for a plaintiff to dem-
onstrate a genuine claim and proceed to trial even where that claim involves a state of
mind issue.
Proof of intent, motive, and other state of mind issues does not depend always on
observation of a witness, but can be proven by objective evidence available through
discovery. To the extent such proof is available, state of mind questions should not go
to the jury automatically where the plaintiff fails to offer substantial probative evidence
contradicting the defendant's evidence of innocent motive or lack of intent. 323
 Such a
practice strains judicial resources and contravenes the very purpose of summary pro-
cedures.
To the extent such issues do depend on credibility determinations and the obser-
vation of a witness's demeanor, trial courts should heed the admonition of Justice Harlan
in his dissenting opinion in Puller. There, he asserted that a plaintiff who offers no
substantial evidence and appears unlikely to succeed at trial should not be allowed to go
to trial on the gamble that the defendant's witnesses will change their testimony under
cross-examination. 324
 One commentator notes that "questions of intent are no more
susceptible than other questions to the possibility of witnesses changing their testimony
between discovery and trial. I f such possibility is sufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion despite the absence of a real factual dispute, then summary judgment will never
be granted." 328
 Thus, courts should not deny a summary judgment motion where a
plaintiff produces no substantial evidence on the mere possibility that the plaintiff will
win its gamble at trial.
Although the plaintiff who must prove an illicit state of mind, motive, or intent
should not go to trial on the mere possibility that a genuine claim will develop, neither
should a plaintiff be without protection at the summary judgment stage from premature
dismissal of a genuine claim. Where there is a question of the plaintiff being "railroaded"
so as not to afford adequate time or discovery to uncover evidence of illicit intent or
improper motive, the Court in Celolex identified the proper remedy: Rule 56(f ), which
allows the trial judge to refuse the motion for judgment, to continue discovery, or to
make such order as is "just." 328
 Rule 56 itself thus provides a safeguard against the
plaintiff's inability to meet the threshold of genuineness by the available pretrial steps.
One commentator describes this provision as an "escape procedure" 327 for plaintiffs,
and as a means for distinguishing between "[t]hose plaintiffs who disclose at least some
evidence and who can show reasonable possibilities for obtaining the rest before or at
trial" and "those who have little or no evidence, and who have either failed to employ
discovery or have employed it to no avail." 328
 Thus, a judge deciding a motion for
summary judgment should heed not only admonitions regarding plaintiffs with little
'" See Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 794-95.
'24 Poller, 368 U.S. at 480 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'25 Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 790.
"6
 Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2554-55.
'2' See The Actual Malice Controversy, supra not 6, at 720.
"1 Id. at 719.
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prospect for success at trial, but should heed their own judgment regarding plaintiffs
who should be given a further chance to demonstrate the genuineness of their claims.
In exercising that judgment whether to deny a motion for summary judgment or
continue the hearing under Rule 56(F), the court could take into account the presence
of state of mind issues which may or may not be proven by objective evidence in a
particular case, the plaintiff's lack of equal access to the evidence, and any facts which
raise doubts about the defendant's denials or explanations of the alleged improper
conduct. 129 This approach considers the particular plaintiff's difficulty in establishing a
case before trial upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in his or her favor.
This is preferable to an approach, typified by Potter and Hutchinson, which presupposes
such difficulty for all plaintiffs, whether or not their evidence will ever be sufficient to
support a verdict in their favor."" Such an approach is also preferable because it focuses
on the provisions of the Rule itself rather than on judicially created exceptions to the
Rule for particular types of plaintiffs.
In addition to the protection afforded by Rule 56(f), the new standards inject a new
element of fairness into the summary judgment process: predictability. Because the new
standards for summary judgment mirror the standard for a directed verdict under Rule
50(a),"' it would be unusual for a plaintiff who has survived a summary judgment
motion not to defeat a Rule 50(a) motion and thus reach the jury."' The new standards
thus give due regard to plaintiffs by not putting them to the expense of a trial where a
directed verdict would be entered against them, and by giving plaintiffs who do survive
a Rule 56 motion a more accurate prediction of their prospects of reaching the jury at
trial.
The dissenting opinions in Anderson suggest that questions of "state of mind" still
linger. Yet, it is not so much the witness's state of mind as the judge's state of mind in
measuring the evidence against the evidentiary standard which troubles the dissenting
Justices.'" These Justices maintain that the threshold for determining whether there is
a need for trial's' has been raised too high. These opinions suggest that the incorporation
of the substantive evidentiary burden requires more than is necessary from plaintiffs,"""
and more than should be allowed from judges, who, the dissenting Justices feared, would
usurp a plaintiff's right to a jury trial.""'
The heightened burden of proof at the summary judgment stage requires not only
more from plaintiffs, but also from judges. Judges deciding a motion for summary
judgment must give closer scrutiny to the plaintiff's evidence in order to determine if a
reasonable jury could return a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. In making that determi-
nation, judges must be guided by the "reasonable jury" standard and must not make
"" Id. at 720.
"" See A Critical Analysis, supra note 6, at 766.
" 1 Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2511.
"2 Stewart, Rulings Make Summary Judgment Possible in Complex Litigation, 9 NATI L. J. 22, n.26.
2" See Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2522 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2519 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (Court's opinion is full of language which invites, if not instructs, trial courts to assess
and weigh the evidence much as a juror would).
"4 Id. at 2511.
2" See id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (plaintiff need only present evidence which supports
his or her claim, regardless of the burden of proof).
"6 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (grave concerns are raised concerning the constitutional
right to jury trial if judge is to weigh the evidence).
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their own independent determination. The ability of the trial courts, prior to Matsushita
and Anderson, to get around the cautions of Roller and Hutchinson without requiring
independent judicial determination"7 demonstrates how the trial courts can apply Rule
56 to state of mind issues as they would to any factual issue," and grant summary
judgment when no genuine factual dispute exists." Judges can and must do their job
of disposing of factually unsupported claims, but they must not take over the role of the
jury. Diligence in observing the "reasonable jury" standard and judicious use of Rule
56(f) should provide adequate safeguards.
The Supreme Court's opinions in Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex could be read as
a shift from a pro-plaintiff to a pro-defendant stance in deciding motions for summary
judgment.. 3" Although the focus of this discussion and these cases has been on motions
for summary judgment brought by the defendant, the opinions are better read not as
serving the interests of plaintiffs or defendants — or of a particular class of defendants
— but as serving the purposes of the Rule as a means of conserving the resources of the
courts by isolating and disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses. 341 The
categorical approach of the past obscured the proper application of the Rule. The
recently enunciated standards by the Supreme Court should be read to clarify the
purpose of the Rule by drawing lines based on the merits of a particular claim or defense
rather than on the type of litigant who is asserting that claim or defense.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decisions in Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex signal a change in
the status of summary judgment procedure, especially in cases involving state of mind.
These decisions have reinvigorated summary judgment as a means for challenging
effectively the party with the burden of proof so as to terminate unfounded litigation
and to conserve the courts' and litigants' resources. In moving away from a restrictive,
557 See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text (rejection of Wasserman requirement of
independent judicial determination of actual malice at summary judgment stage and development
of "neutral" rule in deciding motions for summary judgment in actual malice defamation cases).
"' See Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 794 & n.89.
55 ' See id. at 794.
340 The pro-defendant stance could be read in the Celotex holding that the movant simply must
point out to the trial court the absence of evidence essential to the opponent's claim, Celotex, 106 S.
Ct. at 2553, 2554, coupled with the Anderson holding that in response to defendant's motion the
plaintiff must present evidence which meets the heightened evidentiary burden he or she would
bear at trial. Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2513. Thus, while the defendant has to produce no affirmative
evidence and the plaintiff has to produce evidence which not only supports his or her case but does
so "clearly and convincingly," such a procedure will eliminate "the incongruous shift of the eviden-
tiary burden in a summary judgment proceeding away from the party who will bear it at trial." A
Critical Analysis, supra note 6, at 758. The new standards apply to both defendants and plaintiffs
moving for summary judgment and should not be construed to favor either:
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting
claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses
tried to a jury, but also for the rights of' persons opposing such claims and defenses
to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and
defenses have no factual basis.
Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2555.
341 A Critical Analysis, supra note 6, at 769 (the primary function of summary judgment is to
intercept factually deficient claims and defenses in advance of trial).
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cautionary stance that invited courts to deny categorically summary judgment even where
the plaintiff had little or no chance to succeed at trial, the Supreme Court offers
encouragement to trial courts to utilize the summary judgment procedure to fulfill the
promise of Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of "just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determinations of every action."
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